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Abstract:  We describe the specification of the formal security policy model and formal top-level 
specification for the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) in Alloy, a relatively new modeling 
language and analysis tool.  The state of the art for the formal verification of secure software requires 
representation of an abstract model, and one or more refinements (to the model), in a formal 
specification language.  These specifications are then examined for self-consistency with their 
properties, as well as for consistency between levels of abstraction, all of which can be time 
consuming, and costly.  Alloy provides a simple, intuitive logic framework, in contrast to many other 
formal languages that are intended to support general-purpose mathematics.  In order to determine 
whether Alloy can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the verification of secure computer 
systems, we used it to specify portions of the LPSK formal security policy model and formal top-level 
specification, and utilized the Alloy Analyzer to examine the consistency of the specifications.  The 
security-critical system elements and predicates for security properties were defined in terms of a 
state model, and system operations were represented as state transitions.  While Alloy does not 
support induction or proofs, it can be used to find counter examples in a small scope of state 
transitions. We conclude that Alloy has few limitations and is suitable, as measured by utility and ease 
of use, to include in the toolbox for rapid high-assurance system development.  The primary concern 
with using Alloy for industrial, versus academic, security verification is the scalability of the Alloy 
Analyzer with respect to the state-space of the security model and formal top-level specification. For 
real system verification, Alloy must support a much larger scope.  We found that the translation of an 
existing informal LPSK security policy model to Alloy provided insight for making the model clearer.  It 
is also apparent that Alloy allows for the beginner to formal system verification to quickly climb its 
learning curve.   
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1. Introduction  
The current industrial paradigm of software security involves constant patching of reused software.  
This paradigm is untenable for security and safety critical software that require an extremely high 
degree of assurance that they will behave as expected.  For example, lives depend the proper 
functioning of medical and aviation software.  Lives depend on the proper containment of state 
secretes held on information systems.  The confidentiality and integrity of large amounts of high value 
information (both personal and financial) in commercial-industrial databases needs better, high 
assurance protection. 
 
We describe the specification of the formal security policy model and formal top-level specification for 
the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) in Alloy, a relatively new modeling language and 
analysis tool. In order to determine whether Alloy can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
verification of secure computer systems, we used it to specify portions of the LPSK formal security 
policy model and formal top-level specification (FTLS), [Bowen 1996] and utilized the Alloy Analyzer 
to examine the consistency of the specifications. 
 
This work builds on and extends work of the TCX LPSK. [Irvine 2004]  The TCX is a project to 
develop a Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level 7 (EAL7) [ISO/IEC 2004] system that is open 
to the public in the spirit of the open source movement.  The TCX includes a formal specification of an 
LPSK.  The successful dissemination and adoption of the TCX framework by the growing high 
assurance development community will depend not only on the utility of the framework’s toolset, but 
also on the ease of use of the toolset. It is related to the noninterference work by Goguen and 
Mesequer [Goguen 1982] and to work by David Greve, Mark Vanfleet, John McLean, et. al. [Greve 
2003] [Heitmeyer 2006] who have provided formal verification of separation kernel security models.   
 
2.1 Access Matrices and Security 
Butler Lampson was the first to propose the concept of an access matrix to analyze the information 
flow of a system [Lampson 1971]. The matrix can then be used to study the flow of information in the 
system.  The Bell and LaPadula model places partially-ordered security labels on system resources 
[Bell 1973].  The model allows subjects to write up and read down in the hierarchy, but prohibits them 
from writing down or reading up. The Principle of Least Privilege was first proposed by Saltzer and 
Schroeder [Saltzer 1975].  As its name suggests, it requires system resources to only have access 
privileges that are absolutely necessary. This reduces potential vulnerabilities by eliminating 
unnecessary functionality.   
 
2.2 Separation Kernels 
The concept of a separation kernel was first proposed by Rushby [Rushby 1981] and are currently 
used in military avionics, military communications, and virtual machine monitors (VMM).  For example, 
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, F-22, Joint Tactical Radio system, C-17 Globemaster III, and Unmanned 
Combat Air Vehicle involved separation kernels in their design [Marsh 2002]. 
 
A separation kernel partitions system resources and controls the flow of information between the 
partitions.  The separation kernel ensures that no information flows between partitions other than a 
set of allowed flows, thereby providing the desired security policy.   
 
2.3 Alloy 
Alloy is a formal tool set that includes a specification language and a model analyzer.  It is well suited 
for detecting security flaws in software specifications.  Via what has been coined the “small scope 
hypothesis” [Jackson 2006], Alloy’s model analyzer can manage the complexity of software 
specification.  The Alloy syntax defines sets and relations in such a way that it almost appears to be 
an object oriented programming language.  The elegance and simplicity of this syntax allows for a 
large amount of natural expressivity.   
 
The small scope hypothesis states that if an inconsistency in a model exists there is a high probability 
that it will present itself within a small scope of the model [Jackson 2006].  For example, in a model of 
a file system the number of files modeled is the “scope.”  If no error or inconsistency is found by the 
Alloy Analyzer in a scope of ten, there is a very low probability that an error or inconsistency will 
present itself in a much larger model of a hundred files.  The small scope hypothesis allows for the 
rapid verification of software specifications with much greater detail than other tools. Alloy’s innovation 
is in connecting the elegant world of specification languages with the power of the model checkers.  
 
3. Formal Security Policy Model 
This section presents a basic overview of the TCX LPSK and of Alloy.  It then presents an Alloy 
specification of the FSPM for the TCX LPSK. 
 
3.1 Terminology 
In an access matrix a “resource” denotes both subjects and objects which are typically used to 
indicate which resource is the active entity performing the read and/or write on another passive 
resource.  This model allows one subject to operate on another subject (i.e., one process 
communicating to another process).  The model refers to a subject accessing a resource (which may 
be another subject). 
 
A partition separates a set of items into distinct groupings.  In a separation kernel the resources are 
the items that are partitioned.  The word “partition” is used in the mathematical literature to refer to the 
set of groupings, and it refers to an individual grouping in the separation kernel literature.  This paper 
avoids the confusion by referring to each individual grouping as a Block.  The set of Blocks is a 
partition of the system resources.   
 
3.2 LPSK Overview 
In October 2004, the CISR group at the Naval Postgraduate School published A Least Privilege 
Model for Static Separation Kernels [Levin 2004].  It is a high-level design document for a LPSK and 
its security policy.  The document contains both a description of the security policy and a FSPM 
written in predicate logic that specifies the critical elements of a LPSK, and a security predicate over 
all possible operations that could be included in a secure system. 
 
The specification developed in this paper contains two essential access matrices that are intended to 
be orthogonal to each other.  One represents the flow of information between partitions which is 
confined so as to conform to the Bell and LaPadula model.  The other represents the Principle of 
Least Privilege, i.e., a restriction to the set of flows allowed in the former.  Once the kernel is up and 
operational its flow structure will remain static.  This means that the flows of information as allowed by 
the two matrices will not change during run time. 
 
3.3 Alloy Syntax 
Alloy uses a mix of relational framework and first order predicate logic.  In a join operation, the last 
item of one tuple is matched with the first item of another.  With a brief refresher of the join operation 
and discrete math the Alloy user will be prepared to construct models in Alloy. 
 
The ‘sig’ keyword (short for signature) is used to declare sets.  The ‘extends’ keyword will create 
disjoint subsets much like inheritance in object-oriented programming.  The ‘abstract’ keyword 
indicates that an item should not be created in the model, but that items extended from it may, much 
like the virtual keyword in C++ or the interface keyword in Java. 
 
The ‘pred’ keyword declares a predicate that returns only a true or false value.  The ‘fun’ keyword is 
used for functions and both functions and predicates may take parameters.  The ‘fact’ keyword can be 
used anywhere in the specification to place constraints on the model.  The ‘assert’ keyword is used to 
verify that certain properties hold in the specification.  If the properties stated in the ‘assert’ do not 
hold the Alloy Analyzer will produce a counter example. 
 
3.4 Alloy FSPM of the TCX LPSK 
-- the type Resource is defined 
sig Resource  { 
-- Every Resource belongs to exactly one Block, no more, no less 
  master: one Block 
} 
-- the type Subject is defined 
sig Subject extends Resource {} 
 
-- access rights type 
abstract sig Mode {} 
 
-- read and write 
one sig RD, WT extends Mode {} 
 
In Alloy the first set of braces after a signature definition indicates the attributes of items belonging to 
the set.  The ‘one’ keyword indicates that exactly one item should be generated in the model.  In the 
specification every Resource is assigned exactly one and only one Block.  Thus the Block elements 
partition the Resource elements into equivalence classes as is intended. 
 
-- Block  type, the set of blocks defines the partition of the systems 
sig Block { } 
-- each block has at least one resource - no empty blocks 
{ 
  some r: Resource | r.master = this 
} 
 
The second set of braces of a type definition is used to indicate Boolean constraints placed on the 
set.  The ‘some’ keyword acts as an existential quantifier.  The ‘this’ keyword is used in Alloy to refer 
to the contextual entity being constrained, similar to many object oriented languages.  It will not make 
sense to have an empty Block.  Therefore, in the constraint section of the Block type definition, for 
every Block in the model, there exists at least one resource in the model whose master Block is the 
Block.  The separation kernel is static.  Therefore, there is no reassigning of Resource elements to a 
different Block once the kernel is running. 
 
In Alloy, a 3-tuple or 3 item relation can be used to indicate an access matrix or set of flows.  The 
model of the system will contain three access matrices, bb, sr_flow, and MM. 
 
-- Block-To-Block Flow Matrix 
sig BB { 
  flow:             Block -> Block -> Mode, 
 
-- secondary, derived from the flow 
  basic_flow:   Block -> Block, 
  FLOWS:       Block -> Block 
}  { 
-- definition of basic flow 
  basic_flow =  { 
    a, b: Block |  
      WT in flow[a][b] or 
      RD in flow[b][a]  
   } 
-- transitive closure of basic_flow 
  FLOWS = ^ basic_flow 
} 
sig System { 
  bb:          BB, 
  sr_flow:   Subject->Resource->Mode, 
  MM:        Subject -> Resource -> Mode 
} 
 
The ‘->’ characters are used to indicate a tuple.  Therefore, sr_flow is the relation Subject->Resource-
>Mode.  The sr_flow and bb matrices are intended to be orthogonal, that is, there may be flows 
allowed in one that are not allowed in the other.  These matrices only determine what flows are 
allowed, that is they represent the security policy.  Technically sr_flow is not required to be a subset of 
bb.  That is, it may allow flows that are prohibited by bb, however, in a secure system those flows 
would never be realized, because what is allowed is only the intersection of the two matrices.   
 
The MM matrixrepresents the flows that are actualized by the system in operation.  MM should be 
orthogonal to sr_flow and bb.  That is sr_flow/bb is the policy of what is allowed, and MM is what the 
program wants to do.  A secure system is a system in which all flows in MM are allowed by both 
access matrices bb and sr_flow.  Conversely, an insecure system is a system that contains at least 
one flow in MM not allowed by either bb or sr_flow.  The security predicate states that a secure 
system allows only the program actions (MM) that conform to the policy (sr_flow/bb). 
 
Harrison et. al. [Harrison 1976] proved that in the general case the flow of information in an 
discretionary (i.e., dynamic) access matrix is undecidable.  Dorothy Denning used the lattice 
framework and security labels as constraints on a static access matrix which allow for the 
determination of information flow a priori [Denning 1976].  However, a partial ordering is sufficient.  
Denning also demonstrated that any mandatory policy of interest could be mapped to lattice policy.   
Thus, a partial ordering (“PO”) between the Blocks is imposed, without loss of generality in the access 
hierarchy. 
 
The predicate PO is defined as a relation over a set that is transitive and antisymmetric.  
Antisymmetric means there is no circularity in the relation.  That is, if information leaves a block, there 
is no sequence of flows that will lead back to its self. 
 
pred PO(b_b: Block->Block){ 
  all  i,j,k: (b_b.Block + Block.b_b) |  
 
-- reflexive 
    ( 
      i->i in b_b 
    ) && 
-- antisymmetric 
    ( 
      ((i->j in b_b) && (j->i in b_b)) => (i=j) 
    ) && 
-- transitive 
    ( 
      ((i->j in b_b)  && (j->k in b_b)) => 
                                             (i->k in b_b) 
    ) 
} 
 
The set of all blocks in the block to block relation b_b passed into the predicate can be constructed 
using the join operation and set addition.  Block is the set of all Blocks in the model.  Joining Block 
with b_b like so, b_b.Block, will produce all the blocks of the domain of the b_b relation and Block.b_b 
will produce the range of the relation.  Adding the set of blocks on the lefthand side and the right hand 
side of the relation will produce the set of all blocks in the relation. 
 
Over time an item of information may no longer be sensitive and so it may need to be downgraded.  
To do so requires violating the partial ordering.  Therefore the notion of a trusted subject is 
introduced.  A trusted subject is a subject (i.e., process) that has undergone rigorous analysis and is 
trusted not to downgrade information other than the information it is intended to downgrade [Landauer 
1989].  Verification of this trust is outside the scope of this paper.  However, we desire the model to 
provide a means of identifying the trusted subjects of the system as well as their flows.  This is critical 
to ensure that they receive the required analysis. 
 
sig Trusted_Subject extends Subject {} 
 
There may be flows in the system that involve trusted subjects and violate the partial ordering.  The 
challenge here is to identify which subject, trusted or otherwise, caused a flow in bb.  Since, the 
matrices sr_flow and bb are not syntactically linked this is not straight forward. 
 
Instead, a list of trusted subjects is specified, from which it can be determined whether or not the 
system’s flows are partially ordered if the trusted subjects’ flows are removed. 
 
The manual translation of the original documentation’s [Levin 2004] trusted partial ordering predicate 
(viz., TPO) in the Alloy specification language produced the following counter example from the Alloy 
Analyzer:  Two block-flows, which individually do not upset the partial ordering, when taken together 
upset the partial ordering.  To resolve this conflict an alternative translation of the TPO was 
constructed which more clearly matched the intended security policy.   
 
-- dom is a library function which returns the domain of the relation 
pred TPO(sys: System){ 
 
  let Nontrusted_Subs_in_SR =          
          dom[sys.sr_flow] - Trusted_Subject, 
 
       Nontrusted_Block_Flow =  
       {  
          b1, b2: Block , m: Mode |  
          ( 
             some sub: Nontrusted_Subs_in_SR, 
                       r:     Resource |    
             ( 
             -- sub is a non-trusted subject in the subject part of sr_flow that when combined with some    
             -- resource and the mode of Nontrusted_Block_Flow is also in sr_flow 
 
             (sub -> r -> m) in sys.sr_flow and  
 
-- and the corresponding blocks of  that subject and resource comprises the blocks of  ---------
-- Nontrusted_Block_Flow 
 
             b1 = sub.master and b2 = r.master 
             ) 
          ) 
       } | 
  -- The transitive closure of the intersection of the Nontrusted_Block_Flow and bb.flow with the Mode 
removed should be a partial ordering  -- Alloy 4.0 uses brackets [] to pass parameters to a predicate 
 
  PO[ ^((Nontrusted_Block_Flow &    
             sys.bb.flow).Mode) ] 
} 
-- Defines the state of a secure system 
pred Secure(sys: System) 
{ 
  TPO[sys]  && 
  all sub:  Subject,  
       res:  Resource,  
       mod: Mode | 
  ( 
    (sub -> res -> mod) in sys.MM  
    => 
    ( 
      (sub -> res -> mod) in sys.sr_flow && 
 
      mod in  
            sys.bb.flow[sub.master][res.master] 
    ) 
  ) 
} 
 
4. Alloy and Refinement 
In the formal methods process the formal top level specification (FTLS) is a high level design 
specification that represents a refinement of the abstract concepts and properties of the policy model 
(FSPM) in the form of a general blue print towards implementing the actual system.  A major step of 
the formal methods development process is to prove that the FTLS accurately represents the system 
in its entirety while preserving the properties of the FSPM. 
 
The separation kernel model that was built in the previous section represents the FSPM of the 
separation kernel.  Alloy allows for a gradual incremental development style.  The separation kernel 
FSPM Alloy specification can be reused unaltered in a new augmented Alloy specification.  This 
augmented specification corresponds to a FTLS.  Since the elements and relations of the previous 
level (FSPM) model are preserved the corresponding properties should also be preserved. 
 
4.1 State Transitions 
Demonstrating that the FSPM properties have been preserved in the FTLS presents a challenge.  
Discovering insecurities in the design and implementation of the operating system is the principle 
interest.  A traditional way to formally represent the security of a system is with a state transition 
model, where certain inputs on a state define a transition to a new state.  By defining a set of possible 
transitions and an initial state, all reachable states can be modeled.  Additionally, by defining what 
makes a state valid or invalid, any of the reachable states can be checked if they are invalid states, 
and invalid state-to-state transitions can be identified. 
 
In the FSPM model the signature System and matching predicate Secure naturally correspond to 
states and a definition of state validity, respectively.  An informal system interface document defines 
the operations that can occur in the TCX LPSK.  The FTLS represents these interface operations as 
commands that effect transitions.  With the first state declared secure any of the commands can be 
checked to see if they lead to an insecure state.  If all inputs result in secure states, the system is said 
to be “Secure”.   
 
This use of automata theory to prove security properties of a system is essentially an inductive proof 
of properties in a sequence of state transitions.  Alloy is not capable of induction or proofs.  However, 
Alloy can be used to find counter examples in a small scope of state transitions.  If no counter 
examples are found the security of the system has been demonstrated for that scope. 
 
-- List of commands 
abstract sig Command {} 
one sig no_op_com, 
            read_com, 
            write_com 
extends Command {} 
 
-- An error for each command 
abstract sig Error { } 
one sig read_err, 
            write_err 




  error_message: lone Error, 
  last_command:  Command, 
  arguments:        set univ, 
 
  sys: System 
} 
 
The Command signature characterizes an abstract operation and a subset of the actual operations is 
extended from it.  All the system operations have the ability to return error codes, as do the 
corresponding commands.  The Transition signature encapsulates the state and the inputs to the 
commands.  This increases the ability of the model to be visualized in the Alloy Analyzer.  Alloy has a 
built-in type to represent the universal set (univ) which permits any type in the model to belong to the 
arguments of the transition. 
 
4.2 Two separate models 
Due to limits on the size of the model this experimentation divided the FTLS into two distinct but 
connected sub-systems:  One that represents the system initialization sequence and another that 
represents the system during runtime.  This experimentation developed two Alloy specifications to 
represent the FTLS as distinct sub-systems.  The connectedness of the two sub systems is 
demonstrated by having the last state of the initialization FTLS be the first state of the runtime FTLS.  
Together they cover the FSPM in its entirety. 
 
The major difference between the two FTLS specification parts is the declaration of the first state of 
the transition sequence.  The initialization model has empty matrices in its first state and the runtime 
model has established matrices in its first state.  Another fact in each model defines a transition in the 
system as any of the allowed operations occurring. 
 
-- First fact in the initialization model, state -- transition starts with empty matrices 
fact init_set_up_seq{ 
 
  -- first is a function in the sequence library indicating the first item in the sequence 
  let t = Seq::set_up_seq/first[] | 
 
    no t.error_message && 
    no_op_com = t.last_command && 
    no t.arguments && 
 
    no t.sys.resources && 
    no t.sys.bb.flow   && 
    no t.sys.sr_flow   && 
    no t.sys.MM 
} 
-- First fact in the runtime model, state -- transitions start with completed matrices that are required  
-- not to change 
fact init_run_time 
{ 
  let t = Seq::run_time_seq/first[] | 
 
    no t.error_message && 
    no_op_com = t.last_command  && 
    no t.arguments              && 
 
    Secure[t.sys] 
} 
 
There are separate predicates for each operation, which allows for either success or failure of the 
operation.  Alloy has a construct for if then else which is used in the transition specification to 
articulate the system response whether or not the operation was successful. 
 
While the system is being initialized the allowed information flows are configured.  Thereafter, in the 
runtime model, none of the matrices are allowed to change.  This restriction is replicated in each 
operation. 
 
4.3. The Initialization Model 
At the beginning of the init specification all the matrices are declared to be empty.  The initialization 
operations that affect the matrices are allowed to occur in any order, which allows the matrices to be 
gradually filled by one operation at a time. 
 
The signatures for ResourceID and PartitionID refine the spec towards the interface document.  
Processes are extensions of subjects.   A Partition_Flow_Vector, Resource_Vector, and 
Partition_Resource_Vector were added to represent parameters of the operations.  There are seven 
operations in the initialization model.  The set_partition_flows operation is give as an example below. 
 
-- Used by set_partition_flows 
sig Partition_Flow_Vector { 
  v: Partition_ID -> Partition_ID -> Mode 
} 
 
pred set_partition_flows(sys, sys': System, pvec: Partition_Flow_Vector) 
{ 
  let new_bb = 
  {  
    b1, b2: Block, m: Mode | 
    ( 
      (b1.partition_id -> b2.partition_id -> m)  
                                             in pvec.v 
    ) 
  } | 
 
  sys'.bb.flow = sys.bb.flow + new_bb && 
 
  -- only bb matrix is modified 
  sys'.sr_flow = sys.sr_flow          && 
  sys'.MM = sys.MM                    && 
  sys'.resources = sys.resources 
} 
 
4.4. The Runtime Model 
The TCX design has various operations dealing essentially with memory movement which is a 
fundamental security concern.  The most basic operation in the interface is reading or writing a byte of 
memory.  In order to simplify the modeling of reading and writing the signature Memory_Segment and 
a relation of resources to memory segments were added to the System signature. 
 
Only subjects are allowed to initiate a memory flow.  When a subject reads a byte of memory from 
another resource it is overwriting one of its own bytes of memory (e.g., an internal register) with one 
of the resources bytes of memory.  Likewise, when a subject writes a byte of memory it is overwriting 
one of the resource’s bytes of memory with one of its own. 
 
sig Memory_Segment { } 
 
-- This is added to the System signature for 
-- modeling reading and writing. 
  RM: resources -> Memory_Segment 
 
-- This is a read memory modification 
sys'.RM = ((sys.RM)-(sub->Sreg)) + 
                 (sub->Rreg) 
 
-- This is a write memory modification 
sys'.RM = ((sys.RM)-(res->Rreg)) + 
                 (res->Sreg) 
 
In the read op, (sys.RM)-(sub->Sreg) removes the subject/memory segment mapping from the 




This paper has demonstrated that Alloy was effective for representing and reasoning about the 
security characteristics of a separation kernel.  Our conclusion is that Alloy is a useful tool to include 
in the toolbox of rapid high assurance development.  Its low learning curve allows for the beginner to 
formal methods and high assurance systems to quickly hone their development skills. 
 
The number of operations in the model increased the computational load on the Analyzer.  The most 
complex configuration that could be processed in the initialization model was a scope of three (out of 
a possible seven).  In this respect the current version (4.0) of the Alloy toolset was inadequate. A 
much larger scope would be necessary to reasonably establish a high assurance of security, but 
within the limited scope, the security of the model was demonstrated. 
 
5.1 Future Work 
In a layered system of specifications, each layer must be shown to preserve the security properties of 
the layer from which it is refined.  Morphisms, from category theory, provide a means for 
demonstrating the preservation of such properties. [Specware 2004]   A property of morphisms is that 
if the types and operations are mapped from the source to the target layer, then the properties of the 
source are shown to be preserved in the target, under the conditions of the mapping. 
 
Alloy is suited to demonstrate morphisms by reusing specifications.  The nature of extending a 
signature creates a mapping of each type symbol. However, there remains the effort of.  However, 
Alloy does not yet have built-in constructs, libraries, or templates for proving that the operations of the 
target specification preserve the properties of the source specification operations. In the current work, 
a state transition model was used to look for counter examples.  We believe that a more direct 
approach for representing morphisms in Alloy is possible, and further investigation is recommended. 
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